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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN NEW YORK
Lewis A. Silverman*
The issue of same sex marriage connotes different meanings for varying
segments of our society. Importantly for the legal profession, several issues
should be addressed in discussing this topic. Three questions should be asked of
all that are interested in the legalities of this revolutionary form of marriage. In
this presentation I will attempt to address these three issues. It should be
emphasized, however, that both the legal climate as well as the social climate are
constantly changing and the information provided today may quickly become
untimely.
The three questions to which I direct your attention are: 1) Is same sex
marriage currently legal in New York? 2) Will same sex marriage become legal
in New York? and 3) Will New York recognize same sex marriages and other
types of legal relationships formed outside of New York?
The History of Same Sex Marriage in New York
In New York marriage is a civil contract to be entered into by two people
with capacity and consent: 1 This specific definition in the Domestic Relations
Law does not actually include any language to indicate that the civil contract must
be created only by a male and a female. The only legal interpretation in New
York prior to the current wave of law suits occurred several years ago and is
based on a 1997 ruling from the New York Department of Health which runs the
Bureau of Vital Statistics. 2 Based on that ruling, New York officials have
consistently declined to grant marriage licenses to same sex couples.
Much has been made of the actions of New Paltz Mayor Jason West in
celebrating marriages for same sex couples. Mayor West performed these
weddings without the couples having official marriage licenses. As such he was
charged with a misdemeanor in accordance with Domestic Relations Law §§13,

*Associate Professor of Clinical Law and Director, Family Law Clinic, Touro College, Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center, Huntington, NY.
1
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2005).
2
In the Matter of Storrs v. Holcomb, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835, 245 A.D.2d 943 (App. Div. 3d Dept.
1997).
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17 (the misdemeanor charges were subsequently dropped). 3 However, there is
substantial doubt about the legality of these marriages. Although Domestic
Relations Law §25 states that marriages performed without the formality of a
marriage license may still be valid, 4 the fact is that these omissions were not
accidental; they were deliberate ceremonies in contravention of the requirements
of the Domestic Relations Law. 5
A petition for mandamus was brought to enjoin Mayor West from
solemnizing any marriages where the couple did not have a duly issued license.
In affirming the injunction, the Appellate Division, Third Department, specifically
declined to discuss the constitutional issues regarding same-sex marriage in New
York. Noting that several cases were then being litigated, the Court simply noted
that Mayor West had violated the separation of powers doctrine by making a
judicial determination which exceeded his executive role as mayor. While the
Court noted the pending litigation, it declined to engage in a review of Mayor
West’s justifications for his actions. 6
More importantly for our discussion, while the section defining marriage
itself is not gender specific, Domestic Relations Law §15(1)(a), which describes
the requirements for a marriage license, in two instances refers to bride and groom
or husband and wife. These are gender specific terms and not gender neutral.
Whether the courts will determine that they therefore render the entire marriage
article gender specific is arguable, but at least they do indicate some intent on the
part of the Legislature to create marriage in New York as between a man and a
woman.
The Legal Challenge in New York
During the last several years challenges have been brought to gender
specific or even gender neutral marriage statutes in many jurisdictions, including
3

Charges Against Mayor Who Performed Same-Sex Marriages Are Dismissed as
Unconstitutional: People v. Jason West, 231 N.Y. L.J. 19 (2004) [hereinafter Charges Against
Mayor].
4
See Berenson v. Berenson, 98 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950); Heller v. Heller, 68 N.Y.S.2d
545 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
5
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 25 (McKinney 2005) states: “Nothing in this article contained shall be
construed to render void by reason of a failure to procure a marriage license any marriage
solemnized between persons of full age…” It appears from the statute that if the parties intend to
celebrate a valid marriage, then the lack of a license does not void an otherwise valid marriage.
See Persad v. Balram, 724 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 2001). The person performing the ceremony,
however, may be guilty of a misdemeanor. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §17 (McKinney 2005).
That is the statute used to charge Mayor West. See Charges Against Mayor, supra note 3.
6
In the Matter of Hebel v. West, 803 N.Y.S.2d 242 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2005).
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Hawaii, 7 Vermont 8 and Massachusetts. 9 The challenges to these statutes have not
been based on the United States Constitution; rather, the challenges have been
based on the specific provisions of the individual state constitutions. In Hawaii
the challenge was upheld based on the Hawaii Constitution’s Equal Rights
Amendment, a provision which has no counterpart in the United States
Constitution. In Vermont the challenge was upheld based on the state
Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause, which predates the Fourteenth
Amendment by almost a century. And the most recent successful challenge, in
Massachusetts, was based on the state Constitution’s Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses, although concededly the decision in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health used much federal Fourteenth Amendment analysis to arrive at its
conclusion.
Goodridge is important because, unlike the situation in Vermont, in
Massachusetts the legislature did not fashion an alternative remedy and same-sex
marriages have been celebrated within the Commonwealth since May, 2004.
Goodridge is also significant because the Supreme Judicial Court utilized a hybrid
of federal and state jurisprudence. First, the court recognized that the United
States Supreme Court has established the “right to marry” as a fundamental right
and a component of the right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendments’s
due process clause. 10 The court went on to find a “right to choose to marry” as a
personal liberty interest under the Massachusetts Constitution and its own due
process clause. The court did not thereafter identify a suspect class because it
found the statute in question did not survive even a rational basis review and
“[violated] the basic premises of individual liberty and equality under the law
protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.” 11
The importance of these cases from other states should not go unnoticed.
When an issue is determined based on a state constitution and the state’s
jurisprudence there is no ground for a federal court to become involved in
determining whether a state can grant or deny marriage to a same sex couple.
After Goodridge was issued, the decision was challenged in federal court; the
United States Supreme Court subsequently declined to review the dismissal of the
challenge. 12
7

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
9
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
10
Id. at 957.
11
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I.
12
Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 317 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 2004). Citizens,
including several state legislators, sought “to enjoin enforcement of the Goodridge decision on the
ground that the [Supreme Judicial Court] violated the Guarantee Clause of the federal Constitution
8.
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Challenges were then made to the New York statute based on New York
State’s own equal protection clause. Lawsuits were brought in several counties
which challenge both the interpretation of the statute as gender specific and, in the
alternative, the constitutionality of denying marriage licenses in New York to
same sex couples as a violation of the New York State Constitution. 13 The first
court to rule on these issues held that “the [Domestic Relations Law] does not
authorize same-sex marriage.” 14 The trial court found that there was a liberty
interest in privacy and the fundamental right to choose whom to marry. 15 This
was subject to strict scrutiny analysis for due process purposes, which the court
found that the state did not meet. The court went on to find that New York law
established discrimination based on sexual orientation and could not even satisfy
the rational basis test. 16 The court concluded that the challenged statutes violated
the New York State Constitution’s due process and equal protections clauses.
The Appellate Division disagreed. In a decision issued on December 8,
2005, the First Department criticized the trial court for both its legal analysis as
well as the relief ordered. 17 Quoting extensively from the dissent in Goodridge,
the Court found no violation of either the equal protection or due process clause
of the New York State Constitution and found that “society and government have
a strong interest in fostering heterosexual marriage as the social institution that
best forges a linkage between sex, procreation and child rearing.” 18 Not only did
the Appellate Division find that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
involved no suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny, but the court found no
discrimination in any event. Regarding the due process claim, the court stated:
“The US Supreme Court recognizes traditional, heterosexual marriage as a
fundamental right pursuant to both equal protection and substantive due process
by depriving Plaintiffs of their right to a republican form of government.” Id. at 81. The District
Court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction but found that plaintiffs could not succeed on
the merits and denied the injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits, holding
that the “resolution of the same-sex marriage issue by the judicial branch of the Massachusetts
government, subject to override by the voters through the state constitutional amendment process,
does not plausibly constitute a threat to a republican form of government. Absent such a threat,
our federal constitutional system simply does not permit a federal court to intervene in the
arrangement of state government under the guise of a federal Guarantee Clause question.” Largess
v. Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., 373 F.3d 219, 229 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. den. 543 U.S. 1002
(2004).
13
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
14
Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 589 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2005).
15
Id. at 595-96.
16
Id. at 600.
17
Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2005).
18
Id. at 360.
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liberty and privacy doctrines...New York apparently recognizes a parallel right.”19
The Court further found that it is for the Legislature “to make policy decisions as
to which type of family unit works best for society and therefore should be
encouraged with benefits and other preferences.” 20
A strong dissent argued that there was both a violation of the liberty
interest protected by the due process clause of the New York Constitution, and a
violation of the equal protection clause under heightened scrutiny. More
importantly, the dissent sharply challenged the majority’s linkage between
marriage and family. 21 This linkage was refuted both in Baker and Goodridge,
which both found a constitutional violation where the right of a same-sex couple
to marry had been denied. 22 Justice Saxe argued: “As the institution of marriage
has been redefined within modern American society, the law has adjusted
accordingly. Indeed, the law and policy of this state has adopted a definition of
“family” that includes same-sex couples (see e.g. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74
N.Y.2d 201 (1989)). It is fair to say that both the law and the population
generally now view marriage, at least in the abstract ideal, as a partnership of
equals with equal rights, who have mutually joined to form a new family unit,
founded upon shared intimacy and mutual financial and emotional support. In the
face of such a widely held view, the gender of the two partners to a marriage is no
longer critical to its definition.” 23
A second trial court in New York then considered these issues and issued
a ruling. 24 Justice Joseph Teresi, in Albany County Supreme Court, found that
the New York restriction was a classification based on sexual orientation and
therefore, subject to rational basis review; he further found that the statute did not
violate either the due process or equal protection clauses of the New York
Constitution. 25
This ruling was affirmed on appeal. 26 The Appellate Division, Third
Department found that the definition of marriage as a relationship between one

19

Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
21
Id. at 382.
22
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 864; see also Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941.
23
See Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
24
See Samuels v. N.Y. Dep’t of Health, No. 1967-04 (Sup. Ct. Alb. County 2004), available at
http://marriagelawfoundation.org/mlf/cases/Samuels%20v.%20New%20York.pdf (last visited
May 24, 2006).
25
For the pertinent New York constitutional sections, see N.Y. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 11.
26
Samuels v. N.Y. Dep’t of Health, 811 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 2006).
20
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woman and one man was precisely the “deep root” 27 which made marriage a
fundamental right and found that precedent required the continuing use of the
accepted standard on a rational basis review until and unless the Legislature
decides otherwise.
What is troubling about these decisions is the characterization of the
question presented. The majority in both cases would have us believe that the
relevant question is whether the state has the right to promote heterosexual
marriage. Posed in that way, it is almost impossible for any challenge to succeed,
no matter what choice the state makes. If the question is rephrased, however, it
elicits a different analysis. The question should be whether every individual has a
right, under the New York State Constitution, to a liberty interest in the
fundamental right to marry and an equal protection right in those benefits that
flow from that right. 28
The United States Constitution contains no suspect class for homosexuals.
The level of scrutiny which the Supreme Court apllied in the two most recent
cases which ruled against discrimination was the rational basis standard and
substantive due process. In neither case did the Supreme Court need to find a
special right or protection for homosexuals in the Constitution.
In Romer v. Evans 29 the Supreme Court found that a Colorado
Constitutional Amendment passed by referendum violated the equal protection
clause under rational basis scrutiny, because the amendment took away from
homosexuals’ access to their government. While the Court did not say that
homosexuality deserves suspect class status, the Court made clear that one could
not deny rights given to everyone else based on this category. “We must
conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot
do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment
2 violates the Equal Protection Clause.” 30 Because the statute failed under even a
cursory review the Court had no need to delve further into the equal protection
analysis.

27

Id at 141.
Reconsidering the question presented is nothing new. In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States
Supreme Court, in reversing Bowers v. Hardwick, candidly criticized the narrow focus of the
question presented in Bowers (is there a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy) and substituted
a broader issue: is there a fundamental right to personal privacy? See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
29
Lawrence v. Texas, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
30
Id. at 635.
28
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In Lawrence v. Texas, 31 which explicitly overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 32
the Supreme Court ruled that private, consensual sodomy could no longer be
criminalized. The ruling was the last in a series of cases dating back to Griswold
v. Connecticut 33 and the abortion cases, finding a constitutional right to personal
bodily privacy. Lawrence was a logical extension of Roe v. Wade 34 and Planned
Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey. 35 Because of these cases the Supreme
Court had no need to create an additional suspect class under Fourteenth
Amendment analysis, and the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy and
concurrence by Justice O’Connor were very careful to limit the ruling to state
criminal laws relating to private consensual conduct. Justice Scalia did raise the
possibility that the majority’s opinion did create civil rights for homosexuals and,
in fact, some of the current litigation is perhaps a reaction to his vitriolic dissent. 36
But one expects that when presented with the issue some years down the road, the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts may not be quick to jump into the fray to
create a new class of rights. What will be of more interest is whether they will
honor privacy and marriage rights that may be created by the various states.
The Court of Appeals Decides
The New York litigation alleged that denying marriage licenses to same
sex couples violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the New
York State Constitution. We have seen over the years that the New York Court of
Appeals has been reluctant to specifically create new classes and new categories
of rights absent action by the legislature. For instance, in Alison D. v. Virginia
M., the Court of Appeals declined to grant standing to the former life partner of a
lesbian mother so that the life partner, who was a biological and legal stranger to
the child, could seek visitation with her former co-child. 37 On the other hand, the
court has been much quicker to protect rights that it felt were already established
by the constution or statute. In Matter of Jacob D. the court specifically allowed
same sex domestic partners, as well as a heterosexual non-married couple, the

31

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
33
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36
. “State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are...called into question by today’s decision.”
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 590. And further: “This case ‘does not involve’ the issue of
homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do
with the decisions of this Court.” Id. at 605.
37
In the Matter of Alison v. Virginia, 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991).
32
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right to adopt in a rather tortuous interpretation of the step-parent provisions of
Domestic Law Section §115. 38
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue, at least for the moment, with a
ruling on July 6, 2006. Deciding Hernandez v. Robles and three other
consolidated cases, three judges of the Court held that there is no present
requirement under the New York Constitution for same-sex marriages to be
judicially imposed. 39 First, the Court held that “New York’s statutory law clearly
limits marriage to opposite-sex couples.” The Court made reference to specific
gender terms within the text of the Domestic Relations Law and the “universal
understanding” when the statute was adopted in 1909. 40
The Court phrased the critical question as whether “the Legislature could
rationally decide that, for the welfare of children, it is more important to promote
stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex
relationships.” 41 The Court found marriage and its benefits to be an inducement
for the creation of “stability and permanence in the relationships that cause
children to be born.” 42 The Court further held that the Legislature could decide
that it was better for children to grow up with both a mother and a father. In
justifying this position the plurality seemed to belittle the social science data
offered by amici that there was no difference between same-sex and opposite-sex
households. Finally, the Court noted that it was resolving only the constitutional
issue and the ultimate decision was deferred to the Legislature.
In a concurrence, Judge Graffeo discussed at length the standard of review
to be applied, concluding rational basis was the appropriate elbvel of scrutiny. 43
Judge Graffeo stated that the fundamental right to marry, was expressed in several
Supreme Court cases. 44 In which the fundamental right was tied to human
procreation and therefore specifically implicating a man and a woman. 45 Because
38

In the Matter of Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (1995).
Hernandez v. Robles, No. 05239, slip op. (N.Y. July 6, 2006), available at 2006 WL 1835429.
A three judge plurality issued the opinion of the Court. There was a one-judge concurrence and a
two-judge dissent.
40
Id. at 4.
41
Id. at 5.
42
Id. at 6.
43
The plurality opinion glossed over the standard of review and assumed, without discussing, that
rational basis was appropriate. It is interesting to note that while Judge Graffeo does not appear to
disagree with the plurality, she did not join in that opinion, nor did any of the three judges in the
plurality join her concurrence.
44
Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1(1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978).
45
Hernandez, No. 05329, slip op. at 13 (N.Y. July 6, 2006), available at 2006 WL 1835429, at
*13.
39
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the fundamental right to marry was, therefore, not implicated, the issue could be
reviewed under a rational basis standard of review. She further stated that there
was no apparent gender or sexual orientation bias, thereby not establishing any
intermediate level of scrutiny for review of the equal protections claims. [slip
opinion of Graffeo, J. at 18].
In a dissent, Chief Judge Judith Kaye challenged the jurisprudential basis
for the plurality opinion, as well as its conclusion. Critiquing the plurality’s
framing of the question presented, she stated: “An asserted liberty interest is not
to be characterized so narrowly as to make inevitable the conclusion that the
claimed right could not be fundamental because historically it has been denied to
those who now seek to exercise it…”. 46 She went on to say: “Simply put,
fundamental rights are fundamental rights. They are not defined in terms of who
is entitled to exercise them.” 47 She also disputed as a “distortion” the plurality’s
historical support for the meaning of marriage.
Chief Judge Kaye reframed the appropriate question to address regarding
the equal protection analysis: “[The] question before us is not whether the
marriage statutes properly benefit those they are intended to benefit – any
discriminatory classification does that – but whether there exists any legitimate
basis for excluding those who are not covered by the law.” 48 She went on to
argue that the classification was discrimination based on both sexual orientation
and sex, requiring heightened scrutiny. She further opined that the classification
did not survive even rational basis scrutiny because the interests proffered by the
classification were not furthered by the exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage. 49 She concluded that it was the Court’s duty to safeguard individual
liberties and deference to the Legislature was not required under the separation of
powers doctrine. 50
The conclusion reached in the plurality opinion was not surprising, but the
flawed logic used to reach that opinion was disconcerting. By tying together
sexual activity, marriage, and the procreation and rearing of children, the Court
appears to have grouped together activites which have become legally and
socially separate and independent from each other. The Court completely ignored
the legions of children being raised in New York in single-parent households.
The fact that so much of society finds marriage, per se, barely relevant to the
46

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18.
48
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
49
Id. at 23.
50
Id. at 26.
47
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rearing (and even the conception) of children seemed completely lost on the Court
but presented a gaping hole in the logic which the Court exercised. In fact, the
Court belied its own logic when it stated: “A person’s preference for the sort of
sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the State’s
interest in fostering relationships that will serve children best.” 51 This is
erroneous because it ties sexual activity to the birth of children, and the birth of
children to marriage. Chief Judge Kaye noted that “the ability or desire to
procreate is not a prerequisite for marriage.”52 The state’s interest in the private
sexual activity has been discounted by a line of United States Supreme Court
cases, culminating in Lawrence v. Texas; 53 and the relationship between children
and marriage by the substantial numbers of children who are born and raised
every year outside of marriage.
Does New York Recognize Out-of-State Same Sex Marriages and Civil Unions?
The next issue which we must address is whether New York will accept
the validity of a same sex marriage contracted elsewhere. These marriages are
presently being conducted in Massachusetts and Canada, and civil unions are
being entered into in Vermont and Connecticut. It is complicated by federal law
and by untested provisions of the United States Constitution’s Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 54
At the present time, the only state actually allowing same sex marriages to
be performed is Massachusetts. By gubernatorial interpretation of a statute, it is
limiting same sex marriage to Massachusetts residents. This does not, however,
preclude the possibility of a Massachusetts couple becoming married and then
moving to New York. Same sex marriages are also legal at present in at least four
Canadian provinces and several Western European countries, including the
Netherlands and Belgium. Except for Canada, these jurisdictions seem to be
restricting same sex marriages to their own nationals. 55
In addition, Vermont has created the civil union, a different type of
relationship which entitles the civilly united couple only to such benefits as are
granted under Vermont law. 56 The civil union, however, is not restricted to
51

Id. at 9.
Id. at 23.
53
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
54
U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
55
See, e.g., Kees Waaldijk, Dutch Gays Win Marriage Rights, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Jan.
2001, at 2, available at http://qrd.org/qrd/www/legal/lgln/01.01.pdf (last visited May 24, 2006).
56
An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 2(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1204 (Supp. 2000).
52
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Vermont residents. Connecticut has now also created the civil union and has
become the first state to establish special family rights for same-sex couples
without judicial prompting. 57 Other states, including Hawaii and California have
also created lesser types of domestic partnerships. 58 Furthermore, many
municipalities have provided for domestic partnership registration, including
several in New York, 59 and many private companies now extend benefits to same
sex couples on a voluntary or contractual basis. 60
All states are required to give full faith and credit to the “public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.” 61 There is no exception
for same sex marriages performed in other states. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause has, in fact, been tested with regard to the validity of marriages performed
outside of a particular state’s jurisdiction. In the case of Loughran v. Loughran,
the Supreme Court stated that if the marriage was legal in the jurisdiction where it
was celebrated other states must grant recognition and validity, even if it was
contrary to a particular restriction placed on one or both of the parties. 62 This is
the lex loci rule of marital recognition. 63 The Court did, however, include certain
qualifying language which leaves open the possibility that one state may not have
to accept a same sex marriage as contrary to its moral laws. 64
Matters are complicated by the adoption in 1996 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). 65 Congress passed this legislation specifically to define
marital benefits under federal statutes and restrict them to heterosexual married
57

The Connecticut statute states in pertinent part: “Parties to a civil union shall have all the
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes,
administrative regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as
are granted to spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one man and one woman.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §46b-38nn (West 2005).
58
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1997); CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5)(B) (West 2005).
59
See, e.g., Alfonso A. Castillo, DOMESTIC PARTNERS; Couples get their cards; On program’s
first day in Huntington, couples celebrate right to sign town’s registry but point out its limits,
NEWSDAY, Jun. 15, 2004, at A18.
60
See, e.g., Michael S. Markowitz, Gay Rights: Shareholders' power is the new weapon in fight
for workplace equality, NEWSDAY, Jan. 4, 2004, at F10.
61
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
62
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1933).
63
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §283 (1971).
64
“It is true that, under rules of law generally applicable, these courts may refuse to enforce a
mere right of contract if it provides for doing within the District things prohibited by its laws…It
may, in the exercise of the police power, prohibit the enjoyment by persons within its borders of
many rights acquired elsewhere and refuse to lend the aid of its courts to enforce them.”
Loughran, 292 U.S. at 227.
65
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. §7 (Supp. V 1999) and 28 U.S.C. §1738C (Supp. IV 1998)).
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couples and to allow states to do the same. Prior to this law it did not appear that
federal statutes had a specific definition of marriage, leaving the issue to each
state. Under the first clause of the Defense of Marriage Act, Congress allows the
states to deny full faith and credit to same sex marriages contracted in other states.
In answer to this federal challenge at least thirty-eight states have already adopted
mini-DOMA’s, specifically defining marriage within the state as male-female and
declining to recognize same sex marriages performed elsewhere. (New York is
not one of these states.) None of these mini-DOMA’s have yet been challenged.
Will New York grant full faith and credit to a same sex marriage
contracted in Massachusetts or even extend comity to same sex marriages
celebrated in Canada? I believe the answer to this question is yes. New York
explicitly recognizes the lex loci rule and the Court of Appeals has stated that
even if a couple goes to another state to evade a restriction on marriage contained
in the New York statute, New York will be required to grant full faith and credit
to the marriage if it was valid in the state where it was performed. In In re Estate
of May, 66 the couple, an uncle and niece who were prohibited by statute from
marrying in New York, traveled to Providence, Rhode Island where the marriage
was legal for adherents of the Jewish faith. They then returned to New York
where they lived for 33 years. Upon the wife’s death a challenge arose to the
husband’s application for letters of administration from three of his six children,
who argued that the marriage was null and void and that he was not the surviving
spouse and therefore not entitled to said letters. The Court of Appeals
affirmatively ruled that, if the marriage was legal in Rhode Island, New York had
to recognize it and granted the letters. Therefore, it appears that if any same sex
couple validly marries in Massachusetts and subsequently seeks New York
recognition of the marriage, it should be granted.
The rules of comity are somewhat different. Comity allows New York to
recognize judicial and statutory actions of a foreign country. Thus a foreign
judgment will be recognized by New York unless it was procured by fraud or
recognition would violate a strong public policy of the state, or the original court
lacked jurisdiction. 67 The cases interpreting this rule have generally been
concerned with whether the person challenging international recognition has been
accorded due process, not necessarily as we understand it but at least as to the
fundamental right to appear and to be heard, and whether the challenge would
upset any great moral opposition. For instance, even though many countries
recognize plural marriages, New York declines to grant recognition to any but the
66
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In re Estate of May, 305 N.Y. 486 (1953).
Greschler v. Greschler, 51 N.Y.2d 368 (1980).
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first legally married spouse, even if the subsequent relationship would be
considered a legal marriage in the country of celebration. 68
A recent legal challenge sought New York recognition of a Vermont civil
union. 69 While as indicated earlier, the Vermont statute limits the effect of civil
unions to Vermont’s state laws and benefits, nevertheless an effort was made for
New York recognition. In Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 70 the surviving
civilly united partner of a victim of alleged medical malpractice sought
recognition as surviving spouse in New York to maintain the malpractice action.
A Nassau County Supreme Court justice, on a motion to dismiss, granted
recognition to the Vermont civil union, but the Appellate Division, Second
Department, reversed.
In declining to recognize Langan’s standing as a surviving spouse, the
appellate court engaged in a cursory analysis of the judicial precedents regarding
same-sex marriage but narrowed its holding to two more basic points to find
EPTL §5-4.1 constitutional. First, the Court noted that the same court had already
spoken on this very issue 71 and precedent justified the same conclusion in
Langan. Secondly, the court found that the state of Vermont, in enacting the Civil
Union law, did not intend to identically equate civil unions with marriage, and
neither plaintiff nor decedent claimed a valid marriage entitled to full faith and
credit or comity. The court’s dictum regarding the constitutional issue was
limited and of little import, although it is curious that the court cited extensively a
Minnesota decision which was not reviewed by the United States Supreme Court,
seeming to draw some constitutional principle from the denial of certiorari. 72
A spirited two-judge dissent would have found a constitutional violation.
Justice Steven Fisher could not “identify any reasonably conceivable rational
basis for classifying similarly-situated wrongful death plaintiffs on the basis of
their sexual orientation.” Going further (and perhaps hinting at future decisions by
New York courts), he challenged the concept that denying the right to file a

68

See, e.g., In re Application of Sood, 142 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Spec. Term 1955); People v. Ezeonu,
588 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992).
69
Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2003).
70
Id. at 412.
71
In re Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1993), appeal dismissed, 82 N.Y.2d
801 (1993). There the court found that “the term ‘surviving spouse’ cannot be interpreted to
include homosexual life partners” for the purpose of a statutory elective share. Id. at 132. The
Langan court found this conclusive on whether a same sex partner could qualify as a spouse for
purposes of the E.P.T.L..
72
See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), cert. denied, 291 Minn. 310 (1971).
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wrongful death claim in any way promoted the state’s interest in fostering
marriage as an institution. 73
Conclusion
It is important to note that the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Hernandez v. Robles was a plurality opinion. Although it is extremely rare for a
court to reverse itself, one has only to look at the change of heart by the United
States Supreme Court from Bowers v. Hardwick 74 to Lawrence v. Texas 75 over a
span of less than two decades. The Court of Appeals will have more than one
change in personnel over the next few years which may bring a review should a
new majority form. It is also possible that the New York Legislature may decide
to approve legislation favoring marriage or some form of civil union for same-sex
couples. The same occurred in Connecticut without any judicial requirement or
mandate. A new governor will sit in Albany in January, 2007, and it will be
interesting to see if the issue of same-sex marriage rights will play out in the
upcoming gubernatorial campaign.
The same sex marriage jungle is thick with political and social intrigue
and litigation. It is ironic that, at this time, so many heterosexual couples are
seeking to get out of marriage while same sex couples are seeking to avail
themselves of the institution. Of course, same sex couples are seeking the same
rights, benefits and recognitions that heterosexual married couples have always
enjoyed. The landscape is changing quickly, and it is possible that what is said
today will need revision next year, in five years and, perhaps in a generation,
when the issue may have been resolved once and for all and the controversy may
have ended.
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